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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Disabilities can affect a child’s ability to thrive in school.  Take for 
example, Jane who is eleven years old, entering the fifth grade, and has a 
learning disability.  She meets the definition of disabled under 20 U.S.C. 
§1401(1).1  The public school Jane attended proposed in her individualized 
educational plan that she continue to attend the public school with once a 
week individual evaluations.  Jane’s parents felt that the placement was 
inadequate given her disability and challenged the school’s determination.  
Her parents placed her in a private school that provided individualized 
education for learning disabled children.  They requested due process 
hearings to dispute the school district’s placement of Jane.2  The hearing 
officer found the placement by the public school inadequate.  The school 
district appealed the administrative decision to the federal district court, 
which found the public school’s placement adequate and reversed. 
Jane’s parents continue their fight and appeal to the circuit court of 
appeals.  In the interim, a placement dilemma arises.  Namely, what should 
Jane’s parents do about her schooling?  They would most likely prefer to 
keep her in the private setting, which they believe is the best place for her.  
Furthermore, at the administrative level, the private school placement was 
found to provide appropriate education.  This decision may be difficult if 
they will not be reimbursed for the tuition during the time the appeal is 
pending.  As such, Jane’s parents’ only option would be to place her in the 
public school that the lower court found appropriate simply because they 
cannot afford to keep her in the private school during the appeal.  This 
result would be unsatisfying because there is a possibility that the court of 
appeals would reverse and find the private school as the appropriate 
setting.  Thus, keeping Jane in the private school during the appeal is in 
her best interest because she would not be moved from school to school, 
and she would have consistency while the placement dispute is ultimately 
resolved.  Consistency is critical as the appeal process could take months 
																																																																																																																												
 1 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2011) (“Child with a Disability” as defined in Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act). 
 2 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A) (2004) (providing an opportunity for any party to 
present a complaint with respect to placement of child); 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 (2007) 
(allowing for mediation of disputes with public agencies). 
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or even years.  In the meantime, Jane needs an education.  Moving back 
and forth between schools only disrupts her education. 
The “stay-put” provision in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) seems to dictate what 
to do with Jane during the litigation; as the provision’s name suggests, she 
would literally “stay-put” in the current school placement until “all such 
proceedings have been completed.”3  The plain language of the statute 
appears to state that all “proceedings” encompasses all judicial 
proceedings, including appeals to the circuit courts for a final 
determination. 
But circuit courts have split over the meaning of the language in 
§ 1415 (j); some circuits read the language broadly, while others interpret 
it narrowly.4  Specifically, some courts implement the stay-put provision 
during appeals from the district level to the circuit level, while others limit 
it to the district level only.5  The reading of the statute has a real effect on 
the daily lives of disabled children.  Circuits that read the language too 
narrowly can limit access to Free Appropriate Education (“FAPE”), a right 
that all disabled students have in this country.  Moreover, the right to 
appeal is limited by the narrow reading. 
This note addresses the current circuit split on deciding when 
pendency ends with the “stay-put” provision and what “all such 
proceedings” entails.  This note argues that the pendency should not end 
until the final resolution through the entire judicial process, including at 
the circuit level.  Further, this note maintains that from the plain language 
of the stay-put provision, it is evident that the Congressional intent was to 
provide students to “stay-put” during the entire appeal process including 
review by the circuit courts.  Part II of this note describes the relevant 
background of the main laws that give students with disabilities access to 
FAPE6 through the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) 
and the Department of Education regulations.7  Part III addresses the 
conflicting case law that has interpreted the stay-put provision and created 
																																																																																																																												
 3 § 1415(j) (“Maintenance of current educational placement: Except as provided in 
subsection (k)(4), during the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this 
section, unless the State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, the 
child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of the child, or, if applying for 
initial admission to a public school, shall, with the consent of the parents, be placed in the 
public school program until all such proceedings have been completed.”). 
 4 Compare M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 112, 125 (3d Cir. 2014), with Andersen 
v. D.C., 877 F.2d 1018, 1023–24 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 5 Compare M.R., 744 F.3d at 125, with Andersen, 877 F.2d at 1023–24. 
 6 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2010) (discussing right to “free public education”); 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1412(a)(1)(A) (2004) (stating “[a] free appropriate public education is available to all 
children with disabilities residing in the State between the ages of 3 and 21, inclusive, 
including children with disabilities who have been suspended or expelled from school”). 
 7 § 1400. 
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a circuit split.8   This section also analyzes the Supreme Court precedent 
on IDEA.  Finally, Part IV argues that the courts should read the language 
of the “stay-put” provision broadly in order to allow disabled students to 
remain in their current placements through all appeals.  Reading the 
provision broadly protects the right of disabled students to FAPE.  
Additionally, the Congressional intent of the Act supports the premise that 
stay-put provision protects disabled students placement through the circuit 
level. 
II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
A. The IDEA and FAPE Aimed at Protecting Disabled Students 
Society in the United States highly values providing all children with 
access to education.9  Although the Constitution does not explicitly grant 
a right to education,10 education is still considered critical to advancing 
individuals and society as a whole.11  Traditionally, those with access to 
formal education secured jobs and contributed to the national economy.12  
The majority of students in the United States attend public school; the 
United States spends thousands of dollars on both the students and teachers 
that support them.13 
Not all students attend public schools as some have the option of 
attending private schooling.  In the United States, about ten percent of 
elementary and secondary school students are enrolled in private schools.14  
The average cost of private schooling can cost as much as a year of college 
tuition.15  While private schooling for most students is an option or 
																																																																																																																												
 8 Compare M.R., 744 F.3d at 125; with Andersen, 877 F.2d at 1023–24. 
 9 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (“In sum, education has a fundamental 
role in maintaining the fabric of our society.”). 
 10 See Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (“Education, of 
course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal 
Constitution.”). 
 11 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (“The American people have 
always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance 
which should be diligently promoted.”). 
 12 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 620 (1995) (“Scholars estimate that nearly a 
quarter of America’s economic growth in the early years of this century is traceable directly 
to increased schooling.”). 
 13 Carole Feldman, Education In America: Facts And Figures As Students Head Back 
To School, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 31, 2013, 12:50 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/31/education-in-america_n_3849110.html. 
 14 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. INST. OF EDUC. SCI. NAT’L CTR FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST 
OF EDUCATION STATISTICS: 2012 (2013), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d12/. 
 15 Emily Driscoll, Private School Education: Worth the Cost?, FOX BUSINESS (Apr. 
27, 2012), http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2012/04/27/private-school-
education-worth-cost/. 
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lifestyle choice by their parents, for disabled students it is sometimes a 
necessity.  Private schooling for a disabled child may be needed if the 
public school does not meet their educational needs.  In the United States, 
approximately thirteen percent of students have disabilities.16  Although 
many disabled students would like to receive their education at public 
schools, if the schools cannot give the disabled child the appropriate 
education they are entitled to, they must look to the private alternative. 
The federal government entitles every child with a disability to 
FAPE.17  Congress passed the IDEA in 1975,18 which provides all children 
with disabilities a FAPE.19  Originally, IDEA was called the Education of 
the Handicapped Act (“EHA”) and was the result of various congressional 
studies that found that disabled children were being excluded from public 
schools throughout the United States.20  Under the Act, FAPE is provided 
if the services for special education are provided for free to the disabled 
student, the services appropriately meet the state standards, and they 
conform to the Individualized Educational Plan (“IEP”).21 
Approximately six million students are protected under IDEA in the 
United States.22  Students may receive services, such one-on-one aides, 
therapy services, and home services, through IDEA in order to help them 
learn in spite of any disability.  Early intervention services are available 
from birth to age two for children with disabilities under IDEA Part C.23  
For children aged three to twenty-one, IDEA Part B provides those special 
education services.24  Various regulations and laws regulate access to 
FAPE.25  To promote participation with IDEA, the federal government 
																																																																																																																												
 16 Center for Public Education, How Many Students with Disabilities Are In Our 
School(s)?, http://www.data-first.org/data/how-many-students-with-disabilities-are-in-
our-schools/. 
 17 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A)(2004). 
 18 20 U.S.C § 1400 (2010); Dennis Fan, No Idea What the Future Holds: The 
Retrospective Evidence Dilemma, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1503, 1507 (2014). 
 19 § 1400 (“Improving educational results for children with disabilities is an essential 
element of our national policy of ensuring equality of opportunity, full participation, 
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities.”). 
 20 § 1400(c)(2). 
 21 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2010) (defining “free appropriate public education” as “special 
education and related services that[:] (A) have been provided at public expense, under 
public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State 
educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school 
education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with [an] 
individualized education program . . . .”); see also Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington, v. 
Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 367–68 (1985) (stating the same). 
 22 Fan, supra note 18, at 1507. 
 23 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Building the Legacy: IDEA 2004, http://idea.ed.gov/ (last 
visited Apr. 30, 2016). 
 24 Id. 
 25 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f); 34 CFR 300.518. 
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provides funds to participating districts.26  Currently, all fifty states, eight 
territories, the District of Columbia, and schools supported by the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs provide programs or services through IDEA.27 
Congress passed the IDEA to fulfill the goal of FAPE.28  The long-
term goal of providing FAPE to children with disabilities was to prepare 
them for “further education, employment, and independent living.”29  
School districts have a duty to comply with IDEA and ensure that FAPE 
is provided to students who require special education.30  Schools that 
receive federal funds must comply with IDEA and ensure that all disabled 
children are receiving the education mandated by the act.31  In fact, besides 
the No Child Left Behind fund, IDEA is the second largest federally 
funded state grant.32 
Implementing IDEA in schools is a process with various steps and 
procedural safeguards.33  First, a specialist usually in the school classifies 
a student as needing additional services or an IEP.34  Second, school 
personnel meet with the child’s parents to formulate the IEP, as required 
by IDEA.35  Under the IEP, which should be individualized to meet the 
student’s needs, the student may be required to be taken out of the regular 
																																																																																																																												
 26 See Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington, 471 U.S. at 368. 
 27 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. & REHAB. SERV., Thirty-Five Years 
of Progress in Educating Children with Disabilities Through IDEA (2010), 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/osers/idea35/history/idea-35-history.pdf. 
 28 See Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter By & Through Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 12 
(1993) (“Congress intended that IDEA’s promise of a ‘free appropriate public education’ 
for disabled children would normally be met by an IEP’s provision for education in the 
regular public schools or in private schools chosen jointly by school officials and 
parents.”). 
 29 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2010). 
 30 See Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992); see also W.G. v. 
Bd. Of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1486 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(noting that IDEA makes state and local educational agencies responsible for the IEP). 
 31 § 1400. 
 32 New Am. Found., School Finance Federal, State, and Local K-12 School Finance 
Overview, http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/school-finance (last updated 
June 29, 2015). 
 33 § 1400. 
 34 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2004). 
 35 Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington, v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985) 
(“The IEP is in brief a comprehensive statement of the educational needs of a handicapped 
child and the specially designed instruction and related services to be employed to meet 
those needs .  . . . The IEP is to be developed jointly by a school official qualified in special 
education, the child’s teacher, the parents or guardian, and, where appropriate, the child. 
In several places, the Act emphasizes the participation of the parents in developing the 
child’s educational program and assessing its effectiveness.”) (internal citations omitted); 
See also 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c); § 1401(19); § 1412(7); §§ 1415(b)(1)(A), (C), (D), (E); 
§ 1415(b)(2); 34 C.F.R. § 300.345 (1984). 
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classroom setting for individualized help.36  The IEP must include: the 
current level of educational performance the student is at; the benchmarks 
or goals for the student; the services that are to be provided; and whether 
the student will participate in the general education program with other 
students.37  Under IDEA, “special education” means “specially designed 
instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of 
a child with a disability, including[:] (A) instruction conducted in the 
classroom, in the home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other settings; 
and (B) instruction in physical education.”38  Most importantly, the IEP 
must include how the district will provide FAPE to the student.39 
The participation of the child’s parents or guardians is paramount 
throughout the entire process.40  The parents have the right to inspect all 
documents pertaining to the IEP and obtain an evaluation by someone 
independent of the school.41  When the IEP is satisfactory to the parents, 
the program continues.  But when the parents are dissatisfied with the IEP, 
they have the right to challenge it.42 
The IDEA provides the procedural safeguards to challenge the IEP.43  
Specifically, IDEA provides that the goals of the FAPE provision will be 
ensured for students through the guaranteed procedural safeguards.44  The 
process begins with a complaint followed by a preliminary hearing where 
the parents discuss their concerns with the local educational agency in 
hopes of reaching an agreement.45  The agency has thirty days to resolve 
the issue to the satisfaction of the parents.46  If the agency has not resolved 
the issue within that time, the parents have the right to request an impartial 
due process hearing.47  Usually the local educational agency or the state 
																																																																																																																												
 36 Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter by & Through Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 10 (1993) 
(describing the process). 
 37 § 1414(d) (describing the IEP in detail). 
 38 20 U.S.C. § 1401(29) (2010); see also Amanda J. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 
877, 890 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating the same). 
 39 § 1414. 
 40 Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington, 471 U.S. at 368–69. (“Section 1415(b) entitles 
the parents ‘to examine all relevant records with respect to the identification, evaluation, 
and educational placement of the child,’ to obtain an independent educational evaluation 
of the child, to notice of any decision to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or 
educational placement of the child, and to present complaints with respect to any of the 
above.”). 
 41 Id. at 369. 
 42 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2015); Id. at 369. 
 43 See § 1415; Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525 (2007). 
 44 § 1415(l). 
 45 § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(IV); Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 525. 
 46 § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii); Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 525. 
 47 § 1415(f)(1)(A); Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 525. 
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educational agency conducts the due process hearing.48  After the hearing, 
the hearing officer makes the determination as to whether the student is 
receiving FAPE.49  After the administrative review, the parties then have 
the right to have a state or federal court review the administrative 
decision.50 
Under IDEA, “any party” can challenge the hearing’s findings or 
decision “in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court 
of the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy.”51  “Any 
party” means that either the school district or the parents can challenge the 
administrative decision.  Courts have noted that the judicial review of 
IDEA claims is “substantially” different than other reviews of agencies in 
that it is far less deferential to lower decisions.52  The main procedural 
differences from the standard appellate review are the evidentiary and 
remedial procedures.53  The reviewing courts can hear more evidence by 
the requesting party than usually allowed by the Federal Rules of evidence 
and award the relief the court finds is appropriate.54 
Various issues can arise in regards to disabled child placement during 
the review period or appeal of the initial determination.55  Under IDEA, 
one provision states that “during the pendency of a proceeding” the child 
is entitled to stay in his “current educational setting.”56  In other words, the 
child should remain where the disabled child was being educated at the 
time of the first dispute of the IEP or placement, unless the parties agree 
otherwise.57  The provision is known as the “stay-put” provision, and it is 
																																																																																																																												
 48 § 1415(f)(1)(A); Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 525. 
 49 § 1415(f)(3)(E); Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 525. 
 50 § 1415(i)(2)(A). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Amanda J. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 887 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Congress 
intended ‘judicial review in IDEA cases [to] differ[] substantially from judicial review of 
other agency actions, in which courts generally are confined to the administrative record 
and are held to a highly deferential standard of review.’”) (quoting Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. 
v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir. 1993)) (alterations in original). 
 53 § 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii)–(iii). 
 54 Id.; Jackson, 4 F.3d at 1471. 
 55 M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 112, 117 (3d Cir. 2014) (“A variety of disputes 
may arise concerning placement. For example, the parents may argue for removing the 
child from public school because they believe the services are inadequate. Or the school 
district might argue for the same result, over the parents’ objection, because it considers 
the child too disruptive to be in a regular school setting. Alternatively, either party could 
be advocating for public-school placement—with the school district insisting that an 
expensive specialized private school is unnecessary or the parents insisting that 
participation in a regular classroom is essential for their child’s development.”). 
 56 § 1415(j); M.R., 744 F.3d at 115. 
 57 § 1415(j). 
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meant to protect the child’s “then-current educational placement” until all 
proceedings are complete.58 
But the stay-put provision does not come into play in every situation 
that involves a placement change.59  Unilateral placement by parents can 
affect reimbursement.60  Take, for example, a the situation where a the 
child is moved from public to private school, and a violation of IDEA is 
filed against the school district much like Jane’s parents in the 
introduction.  If the hearing officer finds that the original public school 
placement provided FAPE, then the parents will not be entitled to 
reimbursement unless the decision is later reversed.61  If neither the 
hearing officer nor district court finds that the school district violated 
IDEA by not providing FAPE, then the parents move to private school was 
unilateral and reimbursement would be unavailable.62 
But if the new placement came about through a mutual agreement 
between parents and the educational agency or district, then the placement 
is protected by the stay-put provision.63  In other words, “[h]aving been 
endorsed by the State, the move to private school is no longer the parents 
unilateral action, and the child is entitled to ‘stay-put’ at the private school 
for the duration of the dispute.”64  In addition, there are other regulations 
that protect the child’s placement when the initial decision by the hearing 
officer supports the parents who are seeking a change of placement.65  The 
decision in the administrative process or by a court later that affirms the 
parent’s decision that the child should be in a private setting will not be 
considered a unilateral action by the parents.66 
																																																																																																																												
 58 M.R., 744 F.3d at 118. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter By & Through Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 
(1993). 
 61 See Susquenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee S. By & Through Heidi S., 96 F.3d 78, 83 (3d 
Cir. 1996). 
 62 Id. 
 63 M.R., 744 F.3d at 118–19 (“The new placement can become the educational setting 
protected by the stay-put rule if the parents and ‘the State or local educational agency’ 
agree to the change.”). 
 64 Id. at 119. 
 65 34 C.F.R. § 300.518 (d) (2016) (“If the hearing officer in a due process hearing 
conducted by the SEA or a State review official in an administrative appeal agrees with the 
child’s parents that a change of placement is appropriate, that placement must be treated as 
an agreement between the State and the parents for purposes of paragraph (a) of this 
section.”). 
 66 M.R., 744 F.3d at 119 (“Having been endorsed by the State, the move to private 
school is no longer the parents’ unilateral action, and the child is entitled to ‘stay-put’ at 
the private school for the duration of the dispute resolution proceedings.”). 
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The public school district will not be subject to the substantial cost 
of private schooling if the public school district provides FAPE.67  But 
once there is a violation of IDEA, reimbursement for private school costs 
is appropriate because without the alternative to public education, the 
disabled child would not be provided with FAPE.68  If disabled students 
were not protected by IDEA and had to pay for private school because the 
public education did not provide appropriate education, then the students 
would not be receiving free appropriate education.69  The courts have 
discretion in dispensing the equitable relief, and they can limit 
reimbursement to what it deems reasonable.70  Therefore, if the private 
school tuition is deemed unreasonably expensive, the courts have the 
authority to limit the amount reimbursed.71 
B. The Stay-Put Provision: Ensures Stability for Disabled Students 
The stay-put provision in the IDEA is a powerful provision to protect 
the educational placement of a disabled student.  The stay-put provision 
acts as a preliminary injunction that does not require the usual showing of 
irreparable harm when there is a dispute about the placement of a student.72  
Also, the stay-put provision performs like an automatic injunction by 
protecting the student’s current educational placement.73  The provision 
explicitly provides that during the “pendency” or time it takes for final 
resolution, the disabled child “shall” or must stay in their current 
educational setting.74 
																																																																																																																												
 67 Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter by & Through Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993) 
(“There is no doubt that Congress has imposed a significant financial burden on States and 
school districts that participate in IDEA. Yet public educational authorities who want to 
avoid reimbursing parents for the private education of a disabled child can do one of two 
things: give the child a free appropriate public education in a public setting, or place the 
child in an appropriate private setting of the State’s choice. This is IDEA’s mandate, and 
school officials who conform to it need not worry about reimbursement claims.”). 
 68 § 1415(e)(2); Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four, 510 U.S at 15–16. 
 69 § 1400 (stating students have the right to “free public education”). 
 70 Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four, 501 U.S. at 16 (“Courts fashioning discretionary 
equitable relief under IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the appropriate 
and reasonable level of reimbursement that should be required. Total reimbursement will 
not be appropriate if the court determines that the cost of the private education was 
unreasonable.”). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Joshua A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist., 559 F.3d 1036, 1037 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A 
motion for stay-put functions as an ‘automatic’ preliminary injunction, meaning that the 
moving party need not show the traditionally required factors (e.g., irreparable harm) in 
order to obtain preliminary relief.”). 
 73 Id. 
 74 § 1415(j). 
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The stay-put provision has protected all types of students and at the 
highest level of the judiciary.  The Supreme Court has deliberated the 
meaning of the stay-put requirement, and it has found the scope of the 
requirement to be substantial.75  Even students who may be considered 
dangerous to other students due to their disabilities have been protected by 
the stay-put provision, and they must remain in their current placement.76 
Congress amended IDEA in 1997 to include that, unless otherwise 
agreed upon between the parents and the state or local agency, the student 
had to remain “in the then current educational placement” during the 
pendency of any proceeding. 77  This provision reflects the concern 
Congress had with disabled students being forced out of public schools 
prior to the amendment of IDEA. 
The United States Department of Education (the “Department”) 
establishes the federal educational policies and administers most of the 
federal assistance to education.78  Congress created the Department in 
1975 with specific purposes, such as building the federal commitment to 
schools to provide access to education for all students equally and to help 
the States improve the quality of education.79  Another main purpose was 
to “increase the accountability of Federal education programs to the 
President, the Congress, and the public.”80  In 2010, the Department’s 
budget was about $60 billion with 4,300 employees.81  The Office of 
Special Education Programs at the Department guides the implementation 
of IDEA.82 
The Department’s stay-put regulation includes language of pendency 
that covers “any administrative or judicial proceeding regarding a due 
																																																																																																																												
 75 Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327 (1988). 
 76 Id. at 325 (holding that schools may not expel or suspend dangerous or disruptive 
special education students). 
 77 Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Construction and Application of Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400 et seq.—Supreme Court Cases, 13 A.L.R. 
FED. 2D 321 (2006) (“In 1997, Congress amended § 615 of the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (20 U.S.C.A. § 1415) to provide, in relevant part, that except during the 
pendency of an appeal from an interim placement of a child, a child must remain in the 
then current educational placement during the pendency of any proceedings under § 1415 
unless the state or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree (20 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1415(j).”). 
 78 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., An Overview of the U.S. Department of Education, (Sept. 
2010), http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/focus/what_pg2.html. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id.; see Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 669 
(1979) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3510). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Center for Parent Information and Resources, IDEA—the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, http://www.parentcenterhub.org/repository/idea/ (last updated 
May 2014). 
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process complaint.”83  The language also mandates that, unless otherwise 
agreed upon between the parents and state, the child “involved in the 
complaint must remain” in the placement that they were in at the time of 
due process complaint.84 
III. CASE LAW AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE “STAY-PUT” PROVISION 
Circuits are currently split on the issue of whether the stay-put 
provision in an IDEA dispute applies through the pendency of a district 
court decision or during the appeals to the circuit courts.85  In most cases, 
this means that the issue is whether a child can remain in the school while 
a parent appeals a federal district court decision to the circuit court of 
appeals. The Sixth Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit courts have 
held that the pendency terminates at the district court level.86  This narrow 
reading would mean that the district court’s judgment would be the final 
judgment.  The implication would be that parents who wanted to appeal 
that court’s decision on their child’s placement would have no right to 
reimbursement between the district trial level and the appeal to the circuit 
level.  Conversely, the Third and Ninth Circuits have held that the 
pendency applies through final resolution of the dispute including appeals 
to the circuit court of appeals.87  Thus, the stay-put provision would remain 
in place until the circuit court’s final determination, and the child would 
be entitled to stay-put provision protection and reimbursement during that 
time under this reading of the Act. 
A. The Stay-Put Provision Ends at the District Level 
In Anderson v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals consolidated four cases that involved four children with learning 
																																																																																																																												
 83 34 C.F.R. § 300.518 (2006). 
 84 34 C.F.R. § 300.518(a) (2006) (“[D]uring the pendency of any administrative or 
judicial proceeding regarding a due process complaint . . . unless the state or local agency 
and the parents of the child agree otherwise, the child involved in the complaint must 
remain in his or her current educational placement.”). 
 85 Compare M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 112, 125 (3d Cir. 2014), with Andersen 
v. D.C., 877 F.2d 1018, 1023–24 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 86 Andersen, 877 F.2d 1023–24 (holding that Congress did not intend stay-put 
financing to cover federal appellate review); Kari H by & Through Dan H. v. Franklin 
Special Sch. Dist., Case Nos. 96-5066/96-5178, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21724, at * 19 (6th 
Cir. Aug. 13, 1997). 
 87 M.R., 744 F.3d at 125 (“Having now considered the question, we agree with the 
Ninth Circuit — and the district court in this case — that the statutory language and the 
‘protective purposes’ of the stay-put provision lead to the conclusion that Congress 
intended stay-put placement to remain in effect through the final resolution of the 
dispute.”); see also Joshua A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist., 559 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
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disabilities and their parents.88  The school districts proposed that the 
children be placed in public schools for learning disabled but the parents 
rejected the placement, and enrolled their children in private schools that 
had full-time special education programs.89  The parents had due process 
hearings in which the district initially was ordered to pay the tuition of the 
private school, however, after the district again proposed the public school 
placement, the hearing officer found it appropriate and denied tuition 
reimbursement.90  The parents appealed to the district court, which denied 
their appeal and also refused to issue a stay-put injunction while the 
parents appealed to the circuit court.91 
The Anderson court rejected the view that “all such proceedings” in 
§ 1415(e) of the stay-put provision meant all proceedings including appeal 
to the circuit court and petition of certiorari to the Supreme Court.92  The 
court reasoned that § 1415(e)(2) only referenced due process hearings, 
state administrative review and civil actions in state or district court.93  The 
court also referenced Honig v. Doe,94 noting that the Supreme Court in that 
case found that one of Congresse’s purposes in enacting § 1415(e)(3) was 
to prevent the schools from unilaterally excluding disabled children from 
public schools.95  As a result, once a district court found the placement 
appropriate, the “change [was] no longer the consequence of a unilateral 
decision by school authorities.”96  The court ultimately held that once a 
district court has found the placement appropriate, the only recourse for 
the parents would be to move for a traditional injunction outside the stay-
																																																																																																																												
 88 Andersen, 877 F.2d at 1019. 
 89 Id. at 1020. (“For school year 1986–87 the school district proposed that each of the 
three be placed in public schools for learning disabled children—Buchanan Learning 
Center, a secondary school, for Joshua Andersen and James Bowers, and Prospect Learning 
Center, an elementary school, for Jason McMullen. The parents rejected the school 
district’s proposed placements and enrolled their children in private facilities providing 
full-time special education programs.”). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 1023 (“We reject this view as inconsistent with the statutory language and the 
case law.”). 
 93 Id. (“The ‘section,’ 1415, speaks of only three types of proceedings: due process 
hearings, state administrative review where available, and civil actions for review brought 
in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States.”) 
(citation & quotations marks omitted). 
 94 Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988). 
 95 Andersen, 877 F.2d at 1023–24. (“[T]he Supreme Court considered a contention that 
school districts should be entitled to change a child’s placement, despite § 1415(e)(3), when 
the child’s presence posed a danger to others; the Court made clear that the section was 
intended to protect children from unilateral displacement by school authorities[.]”). 
 96 Id. at 1024. 
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put provision.97  Ultimately, without the stay-put provision protections 
beyond the district level, the parents would not be reimbursed the expense 
of the private schooling for any appeals after the district level. 
The Sixth Circuit also read the stay-put statutory language 
narrowly.98  In Kari H. By & Through Dan H. v. Franklin Special School 
District, the plaintiff, who was severely disabled, appealed the district 
court’s judgment upholding an administrative law judge’s order, placing 
the plaintiff in a self-contained special education classroom for five hours 
a day.99 The plaintiff moved the district court to enjoin the school district 
under the stay-put provision from implementing the decision pending the 
outcome of the circuit court’s decision.100 
The Sixth Circuit found no error in the lower court’s finding in the 
placement and affirmed.101  The court held that the plaintiff was not 
entitled to the stay-put provision because the section listed the three types 
of proceedings as due process hearings, state administrative reviews, and 
civil actions brought in either state or federal district court.102  The court 
stated that “[i]f Congress wanted the provision to apply to circuit courts, 
it certainly could have said so.”103  The Sixth Circuit read the appeal 
process as only being limited to either the state or federal district court 
because of the language in the stay-put provision.104  The court also 
referenced Honig as illustrating the purpose of the stay-put provision to 
protect children from unilateral displacement by school officials.105  
Finding that the purpose of the Act would not be implicated in the case 
because the district court approved the placement by the school,106 the 
court noted the change of placement was not a unilateral change by the 
school.107 
																																																																																																																												
 97 Id. (“Once a district court has resolved the issue of appropriate placement, the child 
is entitled to an injunction only outside the stay-put provision, i.e., by establishing the usual 
grounds for such relief. Plaintiffs here have attempted no such showing.”). 
 98 Kari H by & Through Dan H. v. Franklin Special Sch. Dist., Case Nos. 96-5066/96-
5178, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21724 (6th Cir. Aug. 13, 1997). 
 99 Id. at *2–5. 
 100 Id. at *8. (“Plaintiff subsequently filed another complaint in the district court seeking 
to temporarily enjoin defendant, pursuant to the IDEA’s stay-put provision, from 
implementing the ALJ’s order pending review of the district court’s decision by this 
court.”). 
 101 Id. at *19. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at *18. 
 104 Kari H by & Through Dan H., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21724, at *18. 
 105 Id. at *19. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
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B. Criticism of the Narrow Reading of the Stay-put Provision 
Other circuits have analyzed the stay-put provision and found that it 
applies through the entire appeals process including circuit review.108  In 
Joshua A. v. Rocklin Unified School District, the Ninth Circuit addressed 
the issue of a disabled student seeking a stay-put reimbursement for 
education incurred during the appeal to the Ninth Circuit.109  The 
plaintiff’s “current educational placement”110 implemented in the IEP was 
provided to the child at his home for forty hours a week.111  The child was 
being provided with in-home educational services during his appeal to the 
Ninth Circuit and sought for the district to continue to co-pay during the 
appeal process.112  The court read the statute broadly, finding that since the 
statute allows a “civil action” to be brought to a district court, the circuit 
courts have jurisdiction because they hear appeals from final judgments of 
district courts pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1291.113 
The Ninth Circuit also pointed out that the Department of Education 
regulation stated “during the pendency of any administrative or judicial 
proceeding.”114  The court emphasized that the Department regulation 
required the same result by including the language “during the pendency 
of any [ . . . ] judicial proceeding.”115 
While the court acknowledged that § 1415(j) listed four kinds of 
proceedings,116 it did not confine its interpretation to those.  The Ninth 
Circuit correctly determined that because civil actions could be brought to 
district courts and circuit courts had jurisdiction to hear appeals from 
district courts, the stay-put provision applied during appeals to the circuit 
level.117 
The Ninth Circuit analyzed Anderson’s holding by the D.C. Circuit 
and concluded that Anderson’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Honig118 was misguided because in Honig, the context was limited to 
																																																																																																																												
 108 See, e.g., Joshua A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist., 559 F.3d 1036, 1037 (9th Cir. 
2009); M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 112, 125 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 109 Joshua, 559 F.3d at 1037. 
 110 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2004). 
 111 Joshua, 559 F.3d at 1037. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 1038. (“Civil actions under the IDEA may be brought in federal district courts. 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). Circuit courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals from final 
judgments of district courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”). 
 114 Id. at 1038 (citation omitted). 
 115 Id. (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.518(a)) (emphasis added). 
 116 Id. (noting that the four proceedings in § 1415 are “(1) mediation; (2) due process 
hearings; (3) state administrative review; (4) a civil action begun by the complaint under 
the IDEA”). 
 117 Joshua, 559 F.3d at 1038. 
 118 Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 322–23 (1988). 
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exigent circumstances.119  The Ninth Circuit noted that Honig involved a 
disabled child who the school district argued posed a danger to other 
students; that scenario was not applicable to the most common placement 
issues that arise under the stay-put provision.120  Further, in a footnote, the 
Ninth Circuit noted that under an amendment in § 1415(k)(1)(G), which 
added exceptions to the pendency provisions, school districts would not 
be required to first appeal the change of placement of a student to the 
courts when “special circumstances” involving weapons, violence, or 
drugs were involved.121 
The Ninth Circuit also weighed policy considerations and found that 
by not applying the stay-put provision, parents would be forced “to choose 
between leaving their children in an education setting which potentially 
fails to meet minimum legal standards, and placing the child in private 
school at their own cost.”122  The Ninth Circuit remanded to the district 
court to determine the amount the district owed the disabled student while 
the appeal was pending.123 
The most recent decision that emphasized the current split of 
authority came from the Third Circuit.124  The Third Circuit in M.R. v. 
Ridley School District held that the stay-put provision of IDEA applies 
through the end of the entire appeal process.125  The court had to decide 
two issues of first impression.126  The first was whether the claim seeking 
payment was timely when filed after a court has ruled in favor of the 
district.127 The second was whether the right to the funding extended 
through the entirety of a judicial appeal.128  The proceedings began with 
Plaintiff’s parents bringing a complaint against the district alleging, among 
other things, that the district failed to provide their child with an 
appropriate IEP and as a result, denied FAPE.129  Plaintiff’s parents 
enrolled their child in a private school and sought reimbursement from the 
school district for the second-grade private tuition.130  The administrative 
hearing officer did find the school district denied Plaintiff of FAPE for the 
																																																																																																																												
 119 Joshua, 559 F.3d at 1039 (“Andersen was too quick to take language from Honig 
outside of the limited context of the exigency argument before the Supreme Court.”). 
 120 Id. at 1038. 
 121 Id. at 1039 n.1. 
 122 Id. at 1040. 
 123 Id. 
 124 M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 112, 125 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 112. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 115; 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2004). 
 130 M.R., 744 F.3d at 116. 
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second grade.131  Two years later, the district court reversed the 
administrative decision finding that the school did provide Plaintiff with 
FAPE.132  After the district’s decision, Plaintiff’s parents requested 
payment of tuition from the date of first administrative decision through 
appeal pursuant IDEA’s stay-put provision, which the school district 
denied, and plaintiffs filed an appeal to the Third Circuit.133 
The Third Circuit began by emphasizing that the “stay-put rule [] 
requires that the child’s placement under the IDEA at the time a 
disagreement arises between the parents and the school district . . . be 
protected while the dispute is pending.”134   The Third Circuit found that 
the school district was required to pay once the administrative hearing 
officer found that the private school placement was appropriate.135  When 
the administrative hearing officer determined that the private setting was 
appropriate, the court found that the placement switched by law from 
public to private and therefore the private setting was afforded protection 
under the stay-put provision.136 
The Third Circuit held that the right to reimbursement proceeded 
through the appeal, and noted that the “protective purposes” of the 
provision and the language of the statute itself supported the conclusion 
that Congress intended for the stay-put placement to remain until all 
proceedings, including all appeals.137 The Third Circuit read the statute 
broadly, specifically, the word “any” in “the pendency of any proceedings 
conducted pursuant to this section.”138 By including civil actions “in a 
district court,”139 the court reasoned that Congress must have meant to 
include appeals to the circuit courts.140 
Even if the Third Circuit did not find the language of the statute itself 
to be persuasive, the court articulated that it would have reached the same 
conclusion based on the statute’s overall goal and policy.141  Emphasizing 
that the Third Circuit has consistently acknowledged that the stay-put 
provision was “designed to preserve the status quo,” the court could not 
“sensibly find that a FAPE dispute” is completely resolved until all 
																																																																																																																												
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 118. 
 135 Id. at 119. 
 136 M.R., 744 F.3d at 124. 
 137 Id. at 125. 
 138 Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j)). 
 139 § 1415(i)(2)(A). 
 140 M.R., 744 F.3d at 125. 
 141 Id. 
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proceedings were completed.  As a result of the decision, the school 
district of Ridley, petitioned for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. 
State courts have also weighed in on the issue of what the stay-put 
provision encompasses.  In North Kitsap School District v. K.W. ex rel. 
C.W., the Court of Appeals of Washington noted that the Anderson holding 
did not coincide with the Congressional intent of IDEA.  The court noted 
that the policy of IDEA was that students remain in place during disputes 
and not be shuffled from school to school while the proceedings were 
resolved.142  The Kitsap court correctly indicated that the Anderson 
decision would limit the district’s financial liability to just the “trial court 
proceedings.”143  As a result of the narrow reading of section 1415 by the 
Anderson court, the Court of Appeals of Washington opined that children 
would be forced out of the private school setting to the public even if the 
dispute continued to the appeals process.144 
C. Supreme Court Precedent Supports Disabled Students’ Right to 
Continue Their Education 
The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of disabled 
students receiving free appropriate education.  In 1985, the Supreme Court 
heard the case of School Commission of Burlington v. Department of 
Education.145  The Court decided the issues of whether “the potential relief 
available under § 1415(e)(2) included reimbursement to parents for private 
school tuition and related expenses, and whether § 1415(e)(3) barred such 
reimbursement to parents who reject a proposed IEP and placed a child in 
a private school without the consent of local school authorities.”146  The 
Court held that when a court determines that the private school placement 
was appropriate and that the IEP’s public school placement was not, the 
school officials would be required to develop an IEP that included private 
schooling and was paid for by the district.147    
The Court emphasized that to hold otherwise would deprive the child 
of FAPE, which they are entitled to under 20 U.S.C. § 1401.148  The Court 
																																																																																																																												
 142 N. Kitsap Sch. Dist. v. K.W. ex rel. C.W.123 P.3d 469, 482 (2005) (holding in 
Andersen does not follow the general policy behind IDEA, which is to keep from disturbing 
the child throughout the statutory process designed to resolve disputes between the school 
district and the child’s parents or guardians over where the child can receive the appropriate 
educational opportunities.). 
 143 Id. at 483 (“Essentially, the Andersen decision suggests that a school district’s 
maximum exposure to the costs of private special education is only through the trial court 
proceedings.”). 
 144 Id. at 482. 
 145 Sch. Comm. Of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985). 
 146 Id. at 367. 
 147 Id. at 370. 
 148 Id. 
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stressed that because of the length of time a “final judicial decision” takes, 
it would be unjust to have parents bear the cost if it was untimely 
determined the private setting was appropriate.149  Not providing 
reimbursement would deprive the student of FAPE and contravene with 
Congress’ intent.150 
The Court further reasoned that since there had been an 
administrative decision after the parents appealed the IEP that found that 
the private school placement was appropriate, reimbursement was 
therefore appropriate.151  Determining that the parents had not violated the 
“conditional command of § 1415(e)(3), that ‘the child shall remain in the 
then current educational placement,’” the Court also determined that they 
had not waived any reimbursement rights by enrolling their son in the 
private school.152  The Court pointed out that had the parents made the 
decision to move the child and had the lower court determined later that 
the appropriate placement was in fact the public school, the parents would 
have been barred from receiving reimbursement.153  Ultimately, the Court 
unanimously held that the Act granted courts the “power to order school 
authorities to reimburse parents” for private school expenses if the lower 
court found that the private school placement instead of the placement as 
proposed in the IEP was proper.154 
  The stay-put provision was litigated to the Supreme Court in a case 
that involved students trying to enforce the stay-put provision in the public 
school.155  One of the main issues before the Court in Honig was whether 
the public school could exclude a disabled student from school because he 
was considered dangerous or disruptive under the Education of the 
Handicapped Act, today known as IDEA.156  The Court refused to read a 
“dangerousness exception” into the act that would allow the displacement 
of the student from current educational setting of the public school.157  The 
Court held that any suspension that lasted more than ten days would be 
considered a “change in placement.”158  The Court emphasized that the 
act’s main purpose was to prevent exclusion of disabled children from the 
schools.159  But should the schools seek to exclude a particularly dangerous 
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 154 Id. at 367. 
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student that would be proper.160  Congress amended the Act following 
Honig to include a “dangerous exception” to the stay-put provision.161 
Both cases to the Court illustrate the protections afforded by IDEA 
and how the Court has guarded those protections.  Moreover, the Court 
emphasizes in both cases the importance of students receiving FAPE and 
staying in current placements when disputes arise. 
IV. PROTECTING DISABLED STUDENTS: WHY THE STAY-PUT 
PROVISION’S PROTECTIONS SHOULD EXTEND THROUGHOUTTHE 
JUDICIAL APPEALS PROCESS 
Analyzing the overarching goals and objectives of IDEA lends itself 
to one logical outcome: disabled students should be provided stay-put 
protection through the entire judicial appeals process.   Although the 
problem may seem just procedural, the consequences can impact both the 
emotional and economic lives of disabled students and their parents.  A 
broader reading of the statutory language is both reasonable and in 
congruency with the case law that has explored the parameters of the 
provision. 
A. The Objective of IDEA Supports the Stay-Put Provision Being 
Placed Throughout the Entire Appeal Process 
The primary goals of IDEA are to protect the disabled and provide 
them with access to FAPE.162  By not including the stay-put protection 
throughout the entire appeals process, disabled students would be stripped 
of the Act’s protection.  Furthermore, they would not be provided with 
FAPE.  Since the stay-put provision is clear in its language, it would also 
be unjust for disabled students to be moved from school-to-school during 
the entire appeals process.  This would contravene the intention of IDEA 
and deprive the disabled of their right to FAPE. 
The IDEA provides essential services for students with disabilities to 
obtain the same education as their counterparts without disabilities.163  The 
key goal is to ensure that services to children with disabilities throughout 
the nation are provided as needed.164  Forcing a disabled student to change 
placement in between appeals would prevent him or her from receiving 
continuous services.  Transitional periods in schools almost undoubtedly 
																																																																																																																												
 160 Id. at 327–28 (noting that the school officials can seek a temporary injunction for 
the removal of a student they deem dangerous but it cannot be of indefinite time and done 
unilaterally). 
 161 20 U.S.C. 1415 (j)(k)(1)(G); 34 C.F.R. Sec. 300.530(g). 
 162 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (d)(1)(A) (2004). 
 163 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a)(4) (2004). 
 164 Building the Legacy: IDEA 2004, supra note 23. 
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result in students having to become accustomed to their new surroundings, 
as well as new teachers.  The process of setting up and implementing the 
services that a disabled student requires also take time.  By depriving a 
student of the stay-put provision, the student is not only losing educational 
time as they adapt to the school, but also losing time being provided 
services they are entitled to in order to receive FAPE. 
Economic discrimination would result if the stay-put provision did 
not apply throughout the entire appeal process including to the circuit court 
level.  Students who could afford private tuition would be able to remain 
in their current placement during the appeal process while students who 
could not afford the tuition would not be able to have the same choice.  
The outcome could result in students with monetary means having 
appropriate education while students without monetary means being 
deprived of FAPE.  The parents of the students who could afford to 
maintain the placement that they feel is the most appropriate would 
undoubtedly do so. 
But for parents without the means, the decision to keep their children 
in the school that they believe is the most appropriate would not be a 
choice at all.  Without the stay-put provision encompassing the entire 
appeal process, disabled children who went back to the public setting 
because of a lack of means would have no recourse after the district level.  
A broad reading of the stay-put provision is thus necessary to eliminate 
income differences among parents of disabled students that would allow 
some, but not all, to continue in their placements during appeals. 
Ultimately, the protection of the most vulnerable was the most 
compelling purpose of the act.  The Third Circuit in M.R. v. Ridley had it 
correct when the court noted that the “protective purposes” of the act easily 
lead to the correct result of keeping the disabled child in the current 
placement until final resolution.165  The preservation of appropriate 
education for the disabled child to preserve the “status quo”166 of his or her 
education is of paramount importance in the daily lives of the disabled.  
Most of these children live every day with unimaginable challenges and 
forcing them to change schools before a final determination is inequitable. 
B. The Broader Reading of the Stay-Put Provision Aligns with the 
Judicial Appeal Process 
A correct reading of the stay-put provision would be that the circuit 
courts have jurisdiction over district courts’ final judgments and, 
therefore, the stay-put provision protects children throughout the entire 
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appeal process including the circuit courts.  Because the language of the 
procedural safeguards of § 1415 give jurisdiction to the district courts,167 
it is clear that the Congressional intent was to protect the placement 
through the entirety of the appeal process, including in the circuit courts. 
Since circuit courts have the jurisdiction to hear appeals from final 
judgments from district courts, it makes sense that the act was intended to 
have the disabled child “stay-put” during all proceedings.  When Congress 
enacted IDEA, they were aware of the jurisdiction that the circuit courts 
with the district courts.  Thus, it is reasonable that appeals to the circuit 
courts were intended to be covered under the stay-put provision.168  The 
reading itself states, “the pendency of any proceedings;” hence, the 
provision did not limit itself to specifying which proceedings were 
covered.  Accordingly, the plain meaning of the stay-put provision 
supports the fact that the provision should remain in effect throughout the 
entire appeal process.  Moreover, since the “then current educational 
placement” has been, at some point prior to the appeal, approved or agreed 
upon by the district, reading the language in the provision as providing the 
disabled student uninterrupted education makes sense. 
Furthermore, it is unfair to limit and discourage the disabled from 
exercising their right to appeal a district court’s disposition.  A disabled 
student’s educational rights and access can surely be said to be worthy of 
appeal.  Limiting parents to just the district level’s decision undermines 
the vigor and passion that most parents have for ensuring their children 
have access to the appropriate education.  There is no justifiable reason 
that Congress would have limited the right of disabled children to appeal 
to the circuit courts when the act itself has so many procedural safeguards. 
Additionally, the option to apply for a traditional injunction is not the 
solution.  Although the Anderson court reasoned that parents would still 
have the opportunity to apply for a traditional injunction if they were not 
afforded the protection of the stay-put provision, this premise goes against 
congressional intent of IDEA.169  The stay-put provision was specifically 
designed to relieve parents of the sometimes heavy and burdensome 
showing that accompany an application of a traditional injunction.170 
																																																																																																																												
 167 20 U.S.C. § 1415. 
 168 See M.R., 744 F.3d at 125. 
 169 Andersen v. D.C., 877 F.2d 1018, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
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C. Supreme Court Precedent Supports a Broad Reading 
 The Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of providing 
FAPE and the power granted to the courts by IDEA to provide appropriate 
relief.171  In Burlington, the Court stressed that a “final judicial decision” 
could take years.172  Thus, it would be unjust to force parents to choose 
between either appropriate education or what they believed to be an 
inappropriate education if it were later determined by a court that the 
private setting was appropriate.173  The Court correctly foresaw that 
parents would battle their child’s placement for years, therefore, 
acknowledging that the appeal process could very likely include the circuit 
courts.174 
The Court in Burlington also reiterated that Congress intended that 
the child’s right to free appropriate public education meant parents could 
fully participate in the IEP process.175  Under a narrow reading of the stay-
put provision, if a parent was refused reimbursement by the district court, 
but later vindicated by the court of appeals, that parent would have no right 
to reimbursement: that would deny free education.  Further, by limiting 
reimbursement to just the district level, parents would not be fully 
participating in the IEP process. 
D. The Cost Should not be the Determinative Factor 
Cost is the major counter-argument against applying the stay-put 
provision through appeals to the circuit level.  While costs may be a 
consideration, it should not be dispositive when deciding the 
appropriateness of the education for the disabled or enforcing the law.  
Furthermore, if the school district provides the appropriate education to 
the disabled, they will not have to shoulder the cost of private school 
because parents would not have to seek an alternative to public schools. 
In addition, the argument that cost is major consideration is 
misguided because an appeal could also be parents appealing to keep their 
child in a mainstream public school setting.  For example, when the district 
moves to have a child removed from the public school and parents appeal 
that decision.  In that case, the cost of schooling would be less to a school 
district. The stay-put provision is still implicated, whether the placement 
is from public to private or vice versa.  Thus, the stay-put provision 
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protects the “then-current placement,” and that could be a public or a 
private one. 
Since the development of IDEA initially was to maintain disabled 
children in the public schools, the stay-put provision can be used by 
parents who are looking to keep their children in mainstream classes, not 
just to keep them in private schools.  Therefore, the premise that allowing 
the stay-put provision to remain through the appellate level would be too 
costly, does not take into consideration the parents who are fighting to 
keep their kids in public settings.  For example, when a school determines 
a student has behavioral issues and wants the student to receive schooling 
at home or in an alternative school, the stay-put provision could also 
potentially allow the student to remain in the public school until the appeal 
process is complete.  Thus, allowing the stay-put provision to remain 
through the appellate level is not costing the district anymore than the 
standard amount spent per student. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The stay-put provision and its protections for the disabled students 
should be kept throughout the entire judicial process including appeals.  
The congressional intent in developing the IDEA supports the stay-put 
provision remaining throughout the appeal process.  Additionally, the fact 
that the circuit courts have jurisdiction to hear district court appeals also 
supports the inference.  The Supreme Court cases that have heard IDEA 
controversies likewise demonstrate the importance of protecting the 
current placement of disabled students.  Finally, in order to maintain 
stability and consistency, the disabled child should be allowed to stay in 
his or her current educational placement until the final disposition of the 
highest court.  All disabled children are entitled to FAPE, thus, stripping 
them of protections during the appeal process would infringe upon this 
right. 
Limiting the stay-put protections to just administrative and trial 
courts, such as district courts, forces disabled children with limited means 
to move back to placements that could have turned out to be inappropriate.  
As a result, these children are deprived of FAPE.  While it is true that the 
circuit court could affirm the district court, by not keeping the stay-put 
provision in place, a disabled child does not have the opportunity to know 
the outcome.  The goal of receiving FAPE would be bifurcated if the 
placement where a student is forced to remain were inappropriate.  Finally, 
the idea that children should be limited stay-put protection by the very 
legislation that was intended to ensure that they receive FAPE that is 
unique to their needs is a bad IDEA. 
 
